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WHAT'S YOURS IS MINE: REFORM OF THE
PROPERTY DIVISION REGIME FOR UNMARRIED
COUPLES IN NEW ZEALAND
Virginia Grainer
Abstract: In February 2002, when the Property (Relationships) Act came into
force, unmarried couples in New Zealand became subject to the same legislative regime
for division of property that has applied to married couples since the 1970s. The
statutory regime is based on a deferred community property principle. Both partners are
free to deal with their own property during the relationship, but at the end of the
relationship all property is classified as either relationship property or separate property.
Relationship property usually includes all property acquired by either party during the
relationship. There is a presumption that this property must be divided equally between
the parties when the relationship comes to an end. Separate property, typically property
owned prior to the relationship, generally remains with the original owner, though this
property too must be shared with the other partner in certain circumstances. Previously,
property of unmarried couples was divided upon separation according to the general rules
of law and equity. While other jurisdictions apply a deferred property regime to married
partners, New Zealand dppears to be the first to apply the regime to unmarried couples to
this extent. The requirement that couples who live together but have not undertaken the
commitment of marriage must share their property 50/50 raises difficult issues of both
law and policy. The most obvious legal issues relate to the determination as to whether,
and from what point in time, an unmarried relationship is subject to this property regime.
The most important policy issue is whether, when applied to unmarried couples, the
deferred property regime leads to fairer results than the traditional treatment. These and
other questions are addressed in this article.
I. INTRODUCTION
Demographic and social developments place stress on the law
governing personal and family relationships. One of the major issues the
law must contend with concerns the division of property in "de facto,"
"unmarried," "domestic," "in the nature of marriage," or "cohabitation"
relationships. New Zealand has recently enacted legislation regulating
property division within these relationships in a way that is unique among
English-speaking jurisdictions. This legislation subjects de facto couples to
the same property division regime as married couples. The regime applies
on an "opt out" basis. If couples do not want to be subject to the regime
specified by the legislation, they must sign an agreement to that effect. This
Article reviews the significance for de facto couples of the principal features
of the regime, its underlying principles and historical drivers, and likely
problems in its implementation.
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A. Changing Social Climate
An increasing number of unmarried people live openly together in
domestic relationships. In New Zealand, census data reveals that the number
of unmarried cohabitants increased 46.1% between 1991 and 1996.1 This
corresponds with two other demographic trends: a decrease in the marriage
rate from 45.5% in 1971 to 15.6% in 2000 (this is the lowest marriage rate
ever recorded in New Zealand)2 and an increase in the divorce rate from
5.1% in 1971 to 12.3% in 2000.'
Divorce no longer has the same stigma as it did thirty years ago.
Many of the people living together outside of marriage do so because they
have recently separated from their spouse and are waiting for a divorce.
Under the Family Proceedings Act 1980, a marriage cannot be dissolved
4until the parties have been living apart for a minimum of two years.
Separated people cannot remarry until their existing marriage has been
dissolved. Additionally, there are many divorced people who are free to
remarry but choose not to do so.
As a result of the increasing number of people living together outside
of marriage, more children are now living in unmarried households.5 Many
countries, including New Zealand, have amended their law to ensure that the
legitimacy of children is not dependent on whether their parents are married
to each other.6  Another factor affecting the marriage rate is the increased
presence of women in the workforce and the resulting financial
independence they have enjoyed.7 Yet another significant change has been
In the 1991 census, 161,856 people were living in de facto relationships. This figure increased to
236,397 at the 1996 census. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, NEW ZEALAND Now: WOMEN 40 (1998)
[hereinafter NEW ZEALAND NOW].
2 Statistics New Zealand, Marriage and Divorces Year ended December 2000 tbl.1,
http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/externa/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/b450 13b35df34b774c2567ed092825/4c256
7ef00247c6acc256a4c000076a8?OpenDocument (May 14, 2001).
' Id. at tbl.3.
4 Family Proceedings Act, 1980, No. 94, § 39(2) (N.Z.).
In Great Britain in 1960, 5% of live births were outside of marriage. By 1999, this figure was just
over 33%. Of these, 75% of live birth registrations were by parents living at the same address. In 1971,
only 2.8% of live births outside of marriage were registered by both parents. By 1997, this figure had risen
to 80%. Family Law Committee of the Law Society (UK), Cohabitation Proposals for Reform of the Law
Family, at http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/dcs/fourth-tier.asp?section id=2615&Caller ID=NS81 (last
visited Feb. 28, 2002). In New Zealand, 42% of all live births in 1998 were registered outside of marriage.
Statistics New Zealand, Vital Statistics Year Ended March 1998, http://www.stats.govt.nz/
4c2565af00bec 19.nsf/173371ce38d7627b4c25680900046f25/5509f4bac8e2ec5c4c256609000a0830?O
penDocument&Highlight-0,ex-nuptial,birth (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
6 Status of Children Act, 1969, No. 18 (N.Z.).
7 According to the 1986 census and the 1996 census, the number of women employed full-time in
New Zealand has increased from 670,002 in 1986 to 808,107 in 1996. NEW ZEALAND NOW, supra note 1,
at 83.
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the increase in the number of people living openly in same sex relationships.
In many jurisdictions consensual sexual activity between people of the same
sex has been decriminalized,8 and discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and marital status has been prohibited.
9 In New Zealand, the
Human Rights Act 199310 and the 1993 amendments to the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 199011 have been significant in this regard. In the United
States, while sodomy laws are still on the books of many states, they are
rarely enforced.1
2
B. Unmarried Couples-Legal Issues
Whether people are in a married or unmarried relationship, and
whether the relationship is a heterosexual or same-sex one, affects their legal
rights in a number of ways.' 3  The nature of the relationship can affect
property rights, succession rights, access to various employment related
privileges and welfare benefits, the legality of sexual activity within the
relationship, the right to visit a partner in a hospital, and rights in relation to
children (including rights to legitimacy, guardianship and custody of
children, the ability to adopt children or to have access to artificial birth
technologies). 14  This Article will focus particularly on one aspect of
8 Kees Waaldijk, Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex
Partners in Europe, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 62, 67-68 (2000).
9 Michael Kirby, Law and Sexuality: The Contrasting Case ofAustralia, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
103 (2001); see also Waaldijk, supra note 8.
1o Human Rights Act, 1993, No. 82 (N.Z.).
" New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990, No. 109 (N.Z.).
12 Five states have same-sex sodomy laws; twelve states have laws that target sodomy between
opposite sexes. Nancy K. Ota, "Family" and the Political Landscape for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender People (Lgbt) Opening Remarks: Queer Recount, 64 ALB. L. REV. 889, 894 (2001).
3 For a discussion of the situation in relation to same sex couples in Australia, see Kirby, supra note
9.
14 For further discussion of the rights of unmarried couples, see Victoria K. Lin, Embracing Minority
Housing and Employment Rights in the New Millennium, 31 MCGEORGE L. REv. 211 (2000); MR.
Carrillo-Heian, Domestic Partnership in California: Is it a Step Toward Marriage?, 31 McGEORGE L. REV.
475 (2000); Jonathan Andrew Hein, Caring for the Evolving American Family: Cohabiting Partners and
Employer Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L. REV. 19 (2000); Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the
Law: Benefits for Unmarried Couples Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 991 (2000);
W. Brian Bumette, Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving The Controversy
Surrounding Same Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81 (1998/1999); Onofrio Ferlisi, Commentaire:
Recognizing a Fundamental Change: A Comment on Walsh, the Charter, and the Definition of Spouse, 18
CAN. J. FAM. L. 159 (2001); Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The
Assimilation of Marriage and Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114 (2000); Reg Graycar & Jenni
Millbank, The Bride Wore Pink . . .To the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act 1999:
Relationships Law Reform in New South Wales, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 227 (2000); Caroline Forder, European
Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371 (2000).
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unmarried couples' rights-their rights to property at the end of their
relationship.
C. Developments in the United States-Heterosexual Couples
The law in the United States of America first took a psychophrenic
view of de facto relationships. On the one hand, there was the institution of
common law marriage, which accorded the de facto partner all the rights of a
legally married spouse. On the other hand, fornication statutes criminalized
sex and cohabitation outside of marriage.' 5  These laws have largely
disappeared. Though common law marriage was abandoned in England
with the passing of Lord Hardwicke's Act in 17 5 3 ,16 it was recognized
widely throughout the United States until relatively recently. Now,
however, only ten states and the District of Columbia give full recognition to
common law marriage. 17  The decision in Marvin v. Marvin initiated a
common law development for dealing with property rights of couples in de
facto relationships.1 8 While some states have followed this approach to the
law, other states have taken a different approach. Texas and Minnesota, for
example, have passed anti-palimony laws limiting the rights of people in de
facto relationships to make property claims at the end of a de facto
relationship.' 9
15 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (2001) ("Any person, not being married, who voluntarily
shall have sexual intercourse with any other person, shall be guilty of fornication, punishable as a Class 4
misdemeanor."). The Idaho Code similarly provides:
Any unmarried person who shall have sexual intercourse with an unmarried person of the
opposite sex shall be deemed guilty of fornication, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $300 or by imprisonment for not more than six months or by
both such fine and imprisonment; provided, that the sentence imposed or any part thereof may be
suspended with or without probation in the discretion of the court.
IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 1997).
" Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act, 1753, 26 Geo. III, c.33 (Eng.).
17 Common law marriage is currently recognized in the following jurisdictions: Alabama, Colorado,
Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas, and the
District of Columbia. Cornell University Law School, Marriage Laws of the Fifty States, District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, at http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/Table Marriage.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2002).
18 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).'9 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (2002); MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-076 (2000). Minnesota's
section 513.075 provides:
Cohabitation; property and financial agreements. If sexual relations between the parties are
contemplated, a contract between a man and a woman who are living together in this state out of
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D. Developments in the United States-Same Sex Couples
Legislative responses in the United States to the increasing visibility
of same sex couples have also been varied. For example, following the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision in Baehr v. Lewin it appeared that same-sex
marriages would gain legal recognition. 20  The Court held that a statute
denying legal recognition to same-sex marriage was unconstitutional on its
face because it violated the equal protection clause of the Hawaii
Constitution. 21 On remand, the trial court likewise held that denial of same-
sex marriage was unconstitutional.22 However, these decisions were quickly
followed by a constitutional amendment that gave the legislature the power
to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples.
23  As a result of this
amendment, denial of same-sex marriage was declared by the Hawaii
Supreme Court not to violate the equal protection clause of the Hawaii
Constitution.24
With the possibility of same-sex marriages now ruled out in Hawaii,
Vermont comes the closest to providing same-sex couples with rights similar
to those of married couples. Vermont's Act Relating to Civil Unions, while
not granting full legal recognition to same-sex marriages, does enable same-
sex couples to enter civil unions and gain entitlement to the same benefits as
married couples. 25  This statute was enacted following Baker v. Vermont,
wedlock, is enforceable as to terms concerning the property and financial relations of the parties
only if:
(1) The contract is written and signed by the parties, and
(2) Enforcement is sought after the termination of the relationship.
MINN. STAT. § 513.075.
Minnesota's section 513.076 provides:
Necessity of contract. Unless the individuals have executed a contract complying with the
provisions of section 513.075, the courts of this state are without jurisdiction to hear and shall
dismiss as contrary to public policy any claim by an individual to the earnings or property of
another individual if the claim is based on the fact that the individuals lived together in
contemplation of sexual relations and out of wedlock in this state.
MINN. STAT. § 513.076.
20 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
21 Id. at 59.
22 Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996), rev'd,
994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (unpublished table decision).
23 "The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." HAW. CONST.
art. 1, § 23.
24 Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (1999).
25 Act Relating to Civil Unions, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(a) (Lexis-Nexis Supp. 2001). See
generally Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex
Marriage, and Separate but (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REv. 113 (2000); Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions:
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where the Supreme Court of Vermont held that denying benefits to same-sex
couples violated the Vermont Constitution's Common Benefits Clause, and
ordered the Vermont legislature to either adopt a domestic partnership
statute or grant same-sex couple the right to marry. 6
The Vermont statute, however, is the exception rather than the rule in
the United States. Some other states do have domestic partnership statutes
that allow for the granting of limited rights to same-sex couples. 27 However,
these statutes differ from Vermont's civil union statute in that the state
registers, but does not sanction, the same-sex relationship.2 8
These developments at the state level are not echoed at the federal
level, where recognition of same-sex relationships is severely limited by the
1996 Federal Defense of Marriage Act.29  This statute limits federal




Some European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands,
have introduced laws to allow same-sex couples to marry and become
subject to nearly all of the legal incidents of marriage, including marital
property regimes. 3' Other jurisdictions, such as Norway, Sweden, Iceland,
and Denmark, allow same-sex and heterosexual unmarried couples to take
on many of the legal incidents of marriage by registering their partnerships.3 2
The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15 (2000); Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions,
Full Faith and Credit, and Marital Status, 89 KY. L.J. 1075 (2001).
" Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999).
27 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Lexis-Nexis Supp. 1999); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 62 (1991).
28 For further discussion, see Carrillo-Heian, supra note 14.
29 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2000) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. V 1999)).
" 1 U.S.C. § 7.
31 See, e.g., Gesetz zur Beendigung der Diskriminierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Gemeinschaften:
Lebenspartnerschaften (Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz) [Act on Registered Partnerships], v. 22.2.2001 (BGBI.
I Nr 9, S 266) (Ger.), discussed in Federal Ministry of Justice, Legislation on Same Sex Partnerships, at
http://www.germanembassyottawa.org/cala/sasexpa.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2002); Wet van 21 december
2000 tot wijzinging van Boek I van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de openstelling van bet
huwelijk voor personen van hetzelfde geslacht (Wet openstelling huwelijk) [Same Sex Marriage Act], Stb.
2001, nr. 468 (Neth.) (discussed in Ministry of Justice, Same Sex Marriages, at
http://www.minjust.nl:8080/abeleid/fact/same-sexmarriages.htm (Apr. 2001)). For a general discussion,
see Katharina Boele-Woelki, Private International Law Aspects of Registered Partnerships and Other
Forms of Non-Marital Cohabitation in Europe, 60 LA. L. REV. 1053 (2000); Caroline Forder, European
Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of Choice, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 371 (2000); Anne Barlow
& Rebecca Probert, Cohabitants: A Survey of European Reforms, 149 NEW L.J. 6913, 1738 (1999).
32 Registered Partnership Act, No. 40 (1993) (Nor.); Registered Partnerships Act (1994) (Swed.);
Registered Partnership Act, No. 87 (1996) (Ice.); Registered Partnership Act, No. 372 (1989) (Den.). See
also Craig A. Sloane, A Rose by Any Other Name: Marriage and the Danish Registered Partnership Act, 5
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189 (1997) (concluding that the Danish Act is an important step, but that the
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The French system of Pacte Civil de Solidarite has a similar effect.33 Both
registered relationship provisions and the Pacte Civil de Solidarite apply
only to unmarried couples who choose to opt in to the regime by completing
the required formalities. In Australia, various states have introduced
legislation regulating the property affairs of unmarried couples.
34 In some
states this legislation covers all types of "domestic relationships."35 The
property regimes established under the various state laws closely
approximate the regime applicable to their married counterparts under
federal law.36 The Australian regimes cover qualifying couples unless they
choose to opt out by mutual agreement.37  In other jurisdictions, such as
Britain 38 and Canada, 39 there is considerable discussion about possible
reform of the property laws relating to unmarried couples. Jurisdictions
contemplating legal reform can capitalize on the experience of those
jurisdictions that have lead the way in this area. In this context New
Zealand's novel regime, covering both married and unmarried couples, is
worthy of consideration.
F. Recent New Zealand Reform Overview
The New Zealand legislature has been wrestling with the law
applicable to the property rights of both married and de facto couples since
the 1960s. Most recently, the legislature enacted the Property
(Relationships) Amendment Act 2001, ("P(R)AA- 2001"; 
"P(R)AA"), 40
which amended the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 ("MPA 1976";
omission of critical rights relegates registered same-sex partnerships to a less-favored position than that of
registered (married) opposite-sex partnerships).
33 CODE CIVIL [C. Clv.] tit. XII (Fr.).
34 Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, No. 147 (N.S.W.), amended by Property (Relationships)
Legislation Amendment Act, 1999, No. 4 (N.S.W.); Domestic Relationships Act, 1994, No. 28 (Austl. Cap.
Terr.), De Facto Relationships Act, 1991 (N. Terr.), Property Law Act, 1974 (Queensl.), amended by
Property Law Amendment Act, 1999 (Queensl.); De Facto Relationships Act, 1996 (S. Austl.); Property
Law Act, 1958 (Vict.), amended by the Statute Law Amendment (Relationships) Act, 2001 (Vict.); De
Facto Relationship Act, 1991 (Tas.).
35 See Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, No. 147 (N.S.W.), amended by the Property
(Relationships) Legislation Amendment Act, 1999, No. 4 (N.S.W.); Domestic Relationships Act, 1994, No.
28 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Property Law Act, 1958 (Vict.), amended by Statute Law Amendment
(Relationships) Act, 2001 (Vict.). See generally, Jenni Millbank, Domestic Rifts: Who is Using the
Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT)?, 14 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 1 (2000).
36 Family Law Act, 1975 (Austl.).
37 See, e.g., Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, No. 147, pt. IV (N.S.W.), De Facto Relationships
Act, 1991, pt. III (N. Terr.).
38 See Family Law Committee of the Law Society (UK), supra note 5; Anne Johnson, Strange
Bedfellows, 149 NEw L.J. 6906, 1432 (1999).
3' For a discussion of the current situation in Canada, see Holland, supra note 14.
40 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001, No. 5 (N.Z.).
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"MPA") 4 I and renamed it the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 ("P(R)A
1976"; "P(R)A").42 Three additional associated amendment acts have been
enacted concurrently. 43 All four acts came into force on February 1, 2002.
As a result of the changes introduced by this legislative package, New
Zealand now has a unique relationship property regime. The regime applies
to all married couples, as well as both heterosexual and same-sex unmarried
couples who have lived together as a couple for a minimum of three years.
If married or unmarried couples do not wish to be subject to the regime, they
must opt out by entering an agreement that complies with proscribed
formalities. Under the new regime, if the marriage or de facto relationship
ends, the couple's property is designated as either separate property or
relationship property. Separate property is generally retained by its owner,
while relationship property is divided between the parties. The P(R)A 1976
provides that the relationship property is to be divided equally, except in
extraordinary circumstances, or when an unequal division is necessary to
correct for economic disparity, at the end of the marriage or relationship.
G. Starting Point for New Zealand Development-The Situation Before
1963
The Matrimonial Property Act of 1963 was the first legislation in New
Zealand to deal comprehensively with the division of the property of married
couples. 4 Prior to 1963, the New Zealand courts, unlike those in Britain,
took a conservative approach and resolved property disputes between
spouses on the basis of legal and equitable title.45 Where. financial
contributions had been made to the purchase of property, the courts were
prepared to find that a resulting trust existed.46 While women were able to
own property,47 most did not work outside the home and, therefore, were
less likely than their husbands to accumulate property. Accordingly, under
this regime women often left the marriage with few or no assets. They
could, however, be awarded a share in the value of the matrimonial home
48
41 Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166 (N.Z.).
42 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, § 5.
43 Family Protection Amendment Act, 2001, No. 8 (N.Z.); Administration Amendment Act, 2001,
No. 6 (N.Z.); Family Proceedings Amendment Act, 2001, No. 7 (N.Z.).
44 Matrimonial Property Act, 1963, No. 72 (N.Z.).
45 Simpson v. Simpson [1952] N.Z.L.R. 278; Masters v. Masters [1954] N.Z.L.R. 82; Barrow v.
Barrow [1946] N.Z.L.R. 438.
46 Hendry v. Hendry [1960 N.Z.L.R. 48.
17 Married Women's Property Act, 1952, No. 53 (N.Z.).
48 Matrimonial Property Act, 1963, No. 72, § 5 (N.Z.).
VOL. I I No. 2
PROPERTY DIVISION IN NEW ZEALAND
or be awarded maintenance.49 New Zealand has never recognized common
law marriage and, until the enactment of the P(R)A, has had no legislation
regulating the property and support issues of de facto couples. Accordingly,
disputes arising at the end of de facto relationships were previously dealt
with under the general rules of law and equity.
H. Matrimonial Property Act 1963
In the early 1960s concerns about the financial plight of divorced
women lead to the enactment of the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 ("MPA
1963"), which dealt with the division of property,50 and the Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1963, 5' which dealt with the award of spousal
maintenance.5 2  Under this regime, judges were authorized to make
discretionary orders regarding the ownership of matrimonial property. Such
orders could be made "as appears just," irrespective of legal title. Judges
were required to consider the spouses' contributions to the matrimonial
home and could, but were not required to, consider the spouses'
contributions in relation to the other property in question. 3 The MPA 1963
specified that contributions could be "in the form of money payments,
services, prudent management, or otherwise howsoever.- 54 The MPA 1963
was amended in 1968 to emphasize that an order could be made in favour of
a spouse "notwithstanding that he or she made no contribution to the
property in the form of money payments or that his or her contribution in
any other form was of a usual and not an extraordinary character." 55 Despite
the 1968 amendment, women usually left the marriage with fewer assets
than their husbands. This was due to the difficulty of establishing a direct
connection between women's domestic contributions and the property in
question. 6 In some instances wives were awarded spousal maintenance
under the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963. However, concern about the
'9 Matrimonial Proceedings Act, 1963, No. 71, pt. IV (N.Z.); Domestic Proceedings Act, 1968, No.
62, pt. IV (N.Z.).
Matrimonial Property Act 1963, No. 72 (N.Z.).
5' Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1963, No. 71 (N.Z.).
52 See the discussion of the regime in E v. E [1971] N.Z.L.R. 859.
53 Matrimonial Property Act 1963, § 6(1).
54 Id.
55 Matrimonial Property Amendment Act, 1968, No. 61, § 6(1) (N.Z.).
56 Caroline Bridge, Reallocation of Property after Marriage Breakdown: The Matrimonial Act 1976,
in FAMILY LAW POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND 234 (M. Henaghan & B. Atkin eds., 1992) ("Wives were
consistently awarded one third or less of the home.").
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inequality of the financial situations of men and women at the end of a
marriage persisted, eventually leading to the enactment of the MPA 1976. 57
I. Matrimonial Property Act 1976-Deferred Community Property
The MPA 1976 established a deferred community property regime.
Although the MPA applied from the date of marriage, the spouses were
largely free to deal with their property as they wished until they separated or
until matrimonial property proceedings were commenced in court.5 8 At this
stage all their property was classified as either separate or matrimonial
property, and subject to the rules of division specified in the Act. Separate
property comprised property that the parties brought to the marriage, or
which an individual party received by gift or inheritance during the
marriage. 59 Matrimonial property comprised all property acquired by either
spouse during the marriage, irrespective of legal title. On division, each
party retained their separate property while the matrimonial property was
subject to a presumptive rule of equal division described below. A couple
could "contract out" of the MPA 1976 by completing an agreement that
complied with the following requirements:
1. The agreement had to be in writing and signed by both spouses;
2. The spouses were required to receive independent legal advice
before signing the agreement;
3. The agreement had to be signed by the lawyer for each spouse; and
4. The lawyers were required to certify that they had explained the
effect and implications of the agreement to their clients before the
clients had signed the agreement.
60
The court was authorized to declare a "contracting out" agreement
void if the court considered it would be unjust to give effect to an agreement
in light of factors specified in the statute.6'
5' Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166 (N.Z.).
58 Id. § 21. Under sections 43 and 44 of the Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, spouses were,
however, unable to transfer their property to defeat the matrimonial property claims of the other spouse.
Matrimonial Property Act, §§ 43-44.
'9 Id. §§ 9-10.
60 Id.§21.
61 Id. § 21(8).
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J. Division of Matrimonial Property Under MPA 1976
Under MPA 1976, matrimonial property was divided into two classes,
the first comprising the home and family chattels, and the second comprising
the balance of the matrimonial property, or "balance property.- 62  Both
classes of property were subject to a presumption of equal division.
63 The
presumption was considerably stronger, however, in relation to the home
and chattels than in relation to the balance of the matrimonial 
property. 64
The presumption of equal division did not apply if the marriage was of short
duration (less than three years),65 or if extraordinary circumstances made
equal sharing repugnant to justice.66 In these cases the property was divided
according to each party's "contribution to the marriage partnership.
'" 67
Under the previous statute, division was made by reference to "contributions
. . . to the property., 68  The new terminology recognized non-financial
domestic contributions. The MPA 1976 specified what acts constituted
69
contributions to the relationship. Management of the household and
performance of household duties were included. y Under the statute there
was no presumption that a financial contribution was of greater value than a
contribution of services.7' Separate property remained the property of the
owner unless the other spouse had sustained or diminished the separate
property, in which case the court was authorized to make an order in the
other spouse's favour.7 2 Furthermore, if any increase in value of separate
property was attributable to the other spouse or the application of
matrimonial property, the increase in value became matrimonial property
subject to the equal sharing rule.73
62 Id. §§ 8-9.
63 Id. §§ 11, 15.
64 See id.
65 d. § 13.
66 Id. § 14.
67 Id. §§ 13(2), 14.
68 Id. § 6(1).
69 Id. § 18(1).
0 Id. § 18(1)(b).
7' Id. § 18(2).
72 Id. § 17, 1976.
7 Id. § 9(3).
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II. PROBLEMS DRIVING FURTHER REFORM
A. Continuing Disadvantage for Women
The MPA 1976 corrected some shortcomings of the MPA 1963. But,
rightly or wrongly, the perception persisted that women were left in a
severely disadvantaged position at the end of a marriage. To what extent
this was so is open to question. However, in New Zealand, as elsewhere, it
was accepted as "an article of faith. 74 Most of the dissatisfaction with the
MPA 1976 focused on the division of property on death, the treatment of
earning capacity, and the treatment of unmarried couples.
B. Division at Death
The MPA 1976 only applied while both spouses were alive.75 In the
event of the death of one or both spouses, the remaining spouse, or a legal
personal representative of either spouse, could make a claim under the MPA
1963.76 This claim could be made against property held in the deceased
spouse's name77 if the surviving spouse was not satisfied with the bequest he
or she received under the deceased spouse's will, or, in the case of intestacy,
their entitlement under the intestate distribution rules of the Administration
Act 1969. Because the MPA 1963 controlled the division of assets in death
cases even after the enactment of the MPA 1976, the division was on the
basis of contributions to the property rather than the relationship. As a
result, women usually fared better when the marriage was terminated by
divorce rather than by death. This was an anomalous result given the
relative needs of the parties in the two situations and it weighed heavily on
women due to their longer life span.
A surviving spouse could make a claim under both the MPA 1963 and
the Family Protection Act 1955. 7 Sometimes women received an additional
share of their deceased husband's estate under the Family Protection Act
1952. Various family members, including spouses, could apply for an order
against the deceased's estate under this statute if, in terms of the deceased's
71 Sanford L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living after Divorce: Vanishingly Small?, 33
FAM. L.Q. 111, 113 (1999).
75 Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166, § 5 (N.Z.).
76 Matrimonial Property Act, 1963, No. 72 (N.Z.).
77 Matrimonial Property Act, 1963, § 5.
78 Family Protection Act, 1955, No. 88, § 5 (N.Z.).
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will or as a result of intestacy, the deceased's estate did not adequately
provide for their proper maintenance and support.79
C. Earning Capacity as Matrimonial Property
Earning capacity was not recognized as matrimonial property under
the MPA 1976,8o although the "breadwinner's" earning capacity was often
the couple's most valuable asset. This put women at a great disadvantage.
The earning capacity of women was often considerably lower than that of
their husbands as a result of the division of functions within the marriage.
Accordingly, divorced women often faced a bleaker financial future than
their ex-husbands. Some women were assisted by an award of maintenance
under the Family Proceedings Act 1980.81 However, maintenance was only
intended to be a short-term measure to assist the applicant spouse to meet
her reasonable needs until she was able to do so for herself. Hence, in
duration and quantum, an award of maintenance did not usually compensate
the applicant spouse, usually the wife, for any long-term disadvantage
caused by having been the homemaker during the marriage. Because the
underlying policy of the MPA 1976 and the Family Proceedings Act 1980
was that a divorce should be a "clean break," maintenance awards were both
minimal and infrequent.
D. De Facto Couples
De facto couples were not covered by the MPA 1976, although it had
been originally proposed that they should be.82 Generally, at the end of a de
facto relationship, the property was divided according to legal title. The
only relief from this division was the remedy of constructive trust. To
succeed in a constructive trust claim the claimant had to prove that:
83
1. The claimant had made contributions, direct or indirect, to the
specific property;
2. The claimant had an expectation of an interest in the property;
3. Such an expectation was reasonable; and
79 See, e.g., In re Delaney (1978] NZ Recent Law 366; Re Snow [1976] NZ Recent Law 13; Olausen
v. Olausen [1977] NZ Recent Law 109; Clemence v. Clemence (1980) 3 M.P.C. 35.
" Z v. Z [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 258.
81 Family Proceedings Act, 1980, No. 94, § 64 (N.Z.). This act repealed both the Matrimonial
Proceedings Act, 1963, No. 71 (N.Z.), and the Domestic Proceedings Act, 1968, No. 62 (N.Z.).
82 Matrimonial Property Bill, 1975, cl. 49.
83 Lankow v. Rose [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 277, 294.
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4. The defendant should reasonably expect to yield an interest to the
claimant.
Awards were limited to the extent of the claimant's direct or indirect
contribution to the relevant property. There was no presumption of equal
sharing for unmarried partners, as there was for married spouses under the
MPA 1976.84 Consequently, even as abetted by the relief of constructive
trust, a de facto partner's share was likely to be less than that received by a
married spouse. In the leading case of Lankow v. Rose,85 for example, Ms.
Rose was awarded a half share of the family home, but was not awarded a
share of her partner's business, even though she had assisted him with it.
Other Acts were similarly limited. Under the Family Proceedings Act
1980, unmarried partners could only be awarded maintenance if a child had
been born of the relationship.86 There was no provision for unmarried
partners to claim against their deceased partner's estate under either the
MPA 1963 or the Family Protection Act 1955.
E. The 2001 Legislative Reform
The 2001 legislative reform sought to address these problems in the
following ways:
1. Continuing disadvantage for women. The P(R)AA removes the
distinction between balance and matrimonial property. Both
classes of property are combined into one class, relationship
property. Under the P(R)AA all relationship property is subject to
the same equal sharing requirement. The three following changes
also redress the disadvantaged position of women in respect of
property matters.
2. Division at death. The P(R)AA applies both before and after the
death of one or both spouses.
3. Earning capacity as matrimonial property. Under the P(R)AA, the
court is authorized to adjust property awards on the basis of
economic disparity arising from the division of functions within
the marriage.
4. De facto couples. The P(R)AA applies with only minor
differences to both married and de facto couples. The inclusion of
4 Id. at 295.
85 id.
86 Family Proceedings Act, 1980, §§ 79-80.
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married and de facto couples under the same regime is particularly
noteworthy.
III. THE 2001 REFORM AND DE FACTO COUPLES
A. The History of the 2001 Reform
Further reform was under discussion for more than ten years prior to
87 88
the enactment of the P(R)AA 200187 and the associated amendment acts.
Calls to improve the MPA 1976 were heard as early as 1988 when the
Working Group on Matrimonial Property and Family Protection established
by the Minister of Justice made recommendations for reform of the property
law relating to both married and de facto couples. The Working Group
proposed that the property of de facto couples be divided according to the
equal division rules of the MPA 1976. If the relationship did not resemble a
marriage, the property would be divided according to the contribution of
each partner to the relationship. 89  The Court of Appeal added to the
momentum for reform by noting in several decisions the need for legislative
action in this respect.
90
In 1998, two reform bills, the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill
and the De Facto Relationships (Property) Bill, were introduced into
Parliament. Despite the change of government in 1999, the bills proceeded
through the parliamentary process. The two bills proposed separate regimes
for the division of the property of married and unmarried couples. However,
the regimes were very similar. Accordingly, when these bills came before
the Parliament in 2000, the Associate Minister of Justice proposed that the
legislation for both married and unmarried couples be incorporated in one
statute. 9' This proposal was accepted, but only after heated debates.92 The
Associate Minister of Justice also proposed that the legislation should apply
87 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2002, No. 5 (N.Z.), available at http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/gpacts/public/text/2001/an/005.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2002).
88 See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
89 N.Z. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF WORKING GROUP ON MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY AND FAMILY
PROTECTION 71 (1988).
9O See, e.g., Z v. Z [1997] 2 N.Z.L.R. 258.
91 Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Hearing before the Committee (Nov. 21, 2000)
(statement of Hon. M. Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/
hansardlhan/text/2000/11/21_021.html.
92 The question of whether or not to include de facto opposite-sex couples in the same regime as
married couples was passed sixty-two to fifty-eight. See Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Hearing
before the Committee (Nov. 21, 2000), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/har/text/2000/
11/21_086.html, http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/11/21_087.html.
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to both heterosexual and same-sex couples. 93  This proposal was accepted
with somewhat less opposition. 94 Finally, the call for reform bore fruit with
the passing of the P(R)AA 200195 and the associated amendment acts.96
B. The Rationale for the 2001 Reform in Relation to De Facto Couples
As amended by the P(R)AA, the Property (Relationships) Act 1976
("P(R)A") applies an equal sharing rule to the division of relationship
property between ex-spouses and former de facto partners. To appreciate
the ultimately problematic impact of this reform in relation to de facto
couples, it is important to identify at the outset the rationale for the reform.
In statements made by those introducing and supporting the legislation
during its passage through the parliamentary process, the emphasis was
largely on fairness, which was equated with the same treatment for both
married and de facto couples. 97 The fact that the provisions that applied to
93 Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Hearing before the Committee (Nov. 21, 2000)
(statement of Hon. M. Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/
han/text/2000/1 1/21 021.html.
94 The question of including same-sex couples within the same regime as married and opposite-sex
de facto couples passed eighty to thirty-nine. See Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Hearing before
the Committee (Nov. 21, 2000), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/1 1/
21 _087.html; http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/11/21 088.html
95 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001, No. 5 (N.Z.). As noted supra in Part IF, this Act
amended the Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166 (N.Z.), and renamed it Property (Relationships) Act
1976. See Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, § 5(1) ("After the commencement of this section, the
principal Act is called the Property (Relationships) Act 1976."). When discussing the 2001 law, this
Article will hereinafter refer to it as Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and will use section numbers as they
appear in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.
96 Family Protection Amendment Act, 2001, No. 8 (N.Z.); Administration Amendment Act, 2001,
No. 6 (N.Z.); Family Proceedings Amendment Act, 2001, No. 7 (N.Z.).
97 "It is great that the bill proposes the same advantages for same-sex couples as married and de facto
couples .... ." Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill: Report of Select Committee (May 4, 2000)
(statement of K. Locke), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/05/04_027.html. "In
our view the time has long since passed when marriage itself is seen as something different, for most
couples, from the decision to live together, share chattels and houses, and in particular bring up children
together. This legislation will fill a long-left gap in the law." Id. (statement of Hon. L. Harre),
http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/05/04029.html.
Hon. M. Wilson stated:
Why should people in de facto or same-sex relationships be treated differently from married
couples? They are a very large and important part of New Zealand society. They accrue assets
during their relationships in the same manner as their married counterparts, and therefore have a
right to the same legal protection. Fundamentally, they have a right to a fair deal, too.
Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Third Reading (Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of Hon. M. Wilson,
Associate Minister of Justice), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/2001/03/29_023.html.
"[The legislation] focuses on the division of property. It does not say anything about the nature of
relationships ... [iut is about fairness; it is about looking after people's rights." Id. (statement of C. Carter),
http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansardhan/text/2001/03/29_027.html. "Just because someone is in a
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the property division of married couples under the MPA 1976 did not also
apply to de facto couples was characterized as discriminatory.
98 This
concern with equality and fairness is reflected in the following clauses in the
statement of purposes in section IM:
(b) To recognise the equal contribution of husband and wife to
the marriage partnership, and of de facto partners to the de
facto relationship; [and]
(c) To provide for a just division of the relationship property
between the spouses or de facto partners when their
relationship ends .... 99
This concern is also reflected in the statement of principles found in section
IN. For example:
(a) The principle that men and women have equal status, and
their equality should be maintained and enhanced.
(b) The principle that all forms of contribution to the marriage
partnership, or the de facto partnership are treated as equal.
(c) The principle that a just division of relationship property has
regard to the economic advantages or disadvantages to the
spouses or de facto partners arising from their marriage or
de facto relationship or from the ending of their marriage or
de facto relationship .... 
100
Where two property situations, such as a marriage and a de facto
relationship, are alike, it is obviously fair to accord them equal treatment.
Where, however, they are not alike, equal treatment can be distinctly unfair.
The legislative reform proceeded on the assumption, largely untested by
reference to factual data, that the property situations of persons in de facto
relationships were identical to those in marriages.
de facto relationship ... does not mean to say that person's rights, in terms of property division, should be
any less than those who are formally married." Id. (statement of K. Locke), http://rangi.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/hansard/han/textI2001/03/29 030.html.
'8 "[I]t is time we stopped discriminating in our legislation against these de facto and same sex
couples." Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Report of Select Committee (May 4, 2000) (statement
of Hon. M. Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice), http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz/hansard/han/text/
2000/05/04 025.html.
9 Property (Relationships) Act, 1976, § IM (N.Z.).
'o Id. § IN.
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C. Meaning of "De Facto Relationship"
The most important definition regarding the scope of the reform is
that of "de facto relationship," set out in the Property (Relationships) Act as
follows:
[A] de facto relationship is a relationship between 2 persons
(whether a man and a woman, or a man and a man, or a woman
and a woman)-
(a) Who are both aged 18 years or older; and
(b) Who live together as a couple; and
(c) Who are not married to one another. 101
The P(R)A also specifies the matters to be taken into account in
determining whether two persons are in a de facto relationship. These
include the duration of the relationship, any sexual relationship, the financial
interdependence of the parties, and the responsibility for the care and
support of children.
0 2
D. Features of the Definition of De Facto Relationship
The definition has the following four features:
1. Opt Out Characteristic
A de facto relationship for the purposes of the P(R)AA 2001 is not a
relationship, such as a contract, a marriage or a registered partnership, which
parties consciously opt into by means of a single voluntary act. Rather, it is
a categorization triggered by a state of affairs (that is, living together as a
couple) over an extended period. 10 3 It is this feature that gives the statute its
opt out characteristic as opposed to the opt in pattern adopted in other
jurisdictions.
:o' Id. § 2D(1).
"2 Id. § 2D.
103 Id. § 2D.
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2. Lack of Detail in Definition
The definition does very little to usefully define the meaning of the
key term in the definition, "relationship." The operative phrase "living
together as a couple" is hardly less vague than the term "de facto
relationship.' °4 Nor is the matter significantly clarified by the enumerated
factors. Taken together, they cover virtually every aspect of human
interaction.
3. Time Limitation
To qualify as a de facto relationship under section 2D of the P(R)A,
the relationship must last at least three years. 1 5 Accordingly, determiningexactly when a de facto relationship begins and ends can be crucial.
4. De Facto Status but no Marriage for Same-Sex Couples
Although the Marriage Act 1955 does not state that the parties to a
marriage must be a man and a woman, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has
held that same-sex couples cannot marry.'0 6 However, the definition of de
facto relationship in the P(R)A is not limited to heterosexual couples.
Accordingly, a de facto relationship will come into existence between same-
sex couples under the same conditions that apply to heterosexual couples
and will be subject to the same equal sharing rule.
E. Scope of the Australian Legislation Compared
There is little doubt that Australian law served, in part, as a model for
the reform act. This is apparent from the footnoted reference to the
equivalent New South Wales legislation in the P(R)A.'
1 7  Both the
Australian and New Zealand legislation establish very similar property
division regimes for people in de facto relationships and marriages. Some of
the Australian statutes are applicable to "domestic relationships" and include
104 See Property (Relationships) Act, § 2D.
105 Id. § 2E. Under section 14, different rules also apply to marriages of short duration (marriages of
less than three years). Id. § 14. Note also the provision for tacking: if a marriage is immediately preceded
by a de facto relationship between the two parties, the de facto relationship will be included along with the
marriage in establishing the length of the marriage. Id. § 2B.
56 Quilter v. Attomey-General [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523.
10' A footnote to section 2D of the Property (Relationships) Act refers to the Property (Relationships)
Act, 1984, No. 147, §§ 4(l)-4(3) (N.S.W.).
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within their ambit relationships between an adult child living with an ailing
parent, or two siblings living together. 0 8 Such a relationship would not be
covered by the New Zealand legislation. However, the factors to be
considered by a court in determining the existence of a de facto relationship
under the P(R)A echo those of a leading Australian decision.'0 9 This is so
despite the fact that those factors were set out to apply in the context of
property division rules, which were significantly different from the New
Zealand counterparts discussed in more detail below.
F. Property Rules of the Reform Legislation
One of the numerous features of the MPA 1976 perpetuated by the
P(R)A is the deferred community property scheme. Until separation or the
commencement of proceedings, spouses or de facto partners are largely free
to deal with property according to legal title."t0 For instance, if a house or
bank balance is titled in the name of one partner or spouse, that person is
free to dispose of the property without regard to the wishes of the other
partner or spouse.
Once the parties are separated, or an application is made to the court
to determine the respective shares of each spouse or de facto partner, or to
divide the property between them, all property is classified by operation of
the law as either separate or relationship property."' Relationship property
includes the property that was formerly known as "balance matrimonial
property" under the MPA 1976112 and encompasses all property acquired by
either spouse during marriage."t
3
Relationship property is prima facie divided equally between the
parties. 14 Under the MPA 1976, the equal sharing rule applied with greater
force to the matrimonial home than to other matrimonial property." 5 Under
the P(R)A, the more stringent version of the rule applies to all relationship
property. Property not qualifying as relationship property is separate
property and is divided according to legal title." 6 The P(R)A generally
108 Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, No. 147 (N.S.W.); Domestic Relationships Act, 1994, No. 28
(Austl. Cap. Terr.), Statute Law Amendment (Relationships) Act, 2001, No. 27 (Vic.).
109 Roy v. Sturgeon (1986) 11 Fam. L.R. 271 (Austl.). See also D v. McA (1986) NSW LEXIS 7001,
at *1 (N.S.W. June 27, 1986).
1i0 Property (Relationships) Act, 1976, § 21 (N.Z.).
1 Id. §§ 8-9.
.2 Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166, § 15.
:' Property (Relationships) Act, § 8.
14 Id. § 11.
115 Matrimonial Property Act, §§ 11, 15.
16 Property (Relationships) Act, § 9.
VOL. I I No. 2
PROPERTY DIVISION IN NEW ZEALAND
carries forward the special rules for converting separate property into
relationship property. For instance, any increase in the value of separate
property, or any income or gains derived from separate property which are
attributable wholly or in part to the application of relationship property,
qualifies as relationship property. "
7
G. Departure from Equal Division
The P(R)A presumption of equal division of relationship property'"8 is
subject to several other provisions of the Act which rely on discretionary
judgment to achieve the purpose of a just division. Under the MPA 1976,
any division that departed from the equal sharing rule was required to be
determined strictly on the basis of contribution to the marriage. 1 9 This is
also true of division under some, but not all, sections of the P(R)A. For
instance, section 13 of the P(R)A, (previously section 14 of the MPA 1976),
provides for a departure from equal sharing where there are "extraordinary
circumstances" that make equal sharing "repugnant to justice." This
requires the determination of the parties' shares to be made in accordance
with their respective contributions to the marriage or the de facto
relationship.' 20  The courts established under the MPA 1976 that both
"extraordinary circumstances" and "repugnant to justice" are required to
satisfy this section. 121 The courts also established a high threshold necessary
to satisfy section 14 of the MPA, met only in relatively few cases. 22 Under
the P(R)A, the significance of section 13 is heightened given that balance
matrimonial property can now only be divided on that basis if this section
applies, and not, as was possible under the MPA 1976,123 as a matter of
course if one spouse's contribution had been clearly greater.
1 Id. § 9A(1).
' Property (Relationships) Act, § 11 (1).
19 See, e.g., Property (Relationships) Act, §§ 14, 14A (marriages and de facto relationships of short
duration); § 16 (adjustment when each spouse owned a home when the relationship began), §§ 17, 17A
(adjustment when one party sustained or diminished the separate property of the other party).
"0o Id. § 13(1).
' See, e.g., Martin v. Martin [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 97; Wilson v. Wilson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 687;
Williams v. Williams, [2000] N.Z.L.R. 122.
122 See, e.g., Martin [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 97; Williams [1979] 1 N.Z.L.R. 122; Dalton v. Dalton [1979]
1 N.Z.L.R. 113; McLaren v. McLaren [1982] 1 N.Z.F.L.R. 273; Ubels v. Barrett [2000] N.Z.F.L.R. 666;
Kauwhata v. Kauwhata [2000] N.Z.F.L.R. 755. See also Wilson [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 697 (comment by
Judge Richardson stating, "It is difficult to envisage any stronger use of language than is reflected in
'extraordinary circumstances' and 'repugnant to justice' to emphasize the stringency of the test which has
to be satisfied in order to justify departure from the equal sharing regime.").
1 Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166, § 15(1).
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H. Adjustment for Economic Disparity
A new principle has been included in the P(R)A in an attempt to
address the significant economic disparity between spouses or de facto
partners at the end of a marriage or relationship. This principle requires the
court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages to the parties
when dividing property.124 In accordance with this new principle, section 15
of the P(R)A authorizes the court to order a lump sum payment or the
transfer of property. This is authorized if the income and living standards of
one party are likely to be significantly higher than those of the other party
because of the effects of the division of functions while the parties were
living together.'
25
Orders under this section can only be made regarding relationship
property. This section will presumably apply, for example, when separation
occurs shortly after one spouse or partner has completed professional
training and the other spouse has been caring for children or undertaking
menial work to support the spouse undertaking the training. Orders
adjusting for economic disparity can also be made under section 15A. These
orders can be made with regard to separate property if any increase in the
value of the separate property of the party with the higher income or living
standard was attributable, wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, to the
actions of the party with the lower income or living standard, while the
parties were living together.
New Zealand courts have been required to consider economic
disparity arising from marriage in relation to claims for spousal maintenance
under the Family Proceedings Act 1980.126 In cases considered under the
Family Proceedings Act 1980 provision, the courts have set a high threshold
of proof for claimants. 27 If this approach is taken in respect to the P(R)A,
departure from equal sharing is likely to be rare.
124 Property (Relationships) Act, 1976, § IN(c) (N.Z.).
125 Section 15(2) of the Property (Relationships) Act provides that, in determining whether or not to
make an order under this section, the court may have regard for the likely earning capacity of each party,
the responsibilities of each party to the ongoing daily care of any minor or dependent children of the
relationship or marriage, and any other relevant circumstances.
126 Family Proceedings Act, 1980, No. 94, § 64(l)(a) (N.Z.).
127 Slater v. Slater [1983] N.Z.L.R. 166; Mackie v. Mackie [1993] N.Z.F.L.R. 213; Wederell v.
Wederell, [1994] N.Z.F.L.R. 928; G v. G [2000] N.Z.F.L.R. 1117.
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I. Property Rules ofAustralian Legislation Compared
There are significant differences between the property division rules
of New Zealand and Australia. The Australian federal statute, the Family
Law Act 1975, which regulates the division of property of married couples,
authorizes the court to make an order altering the property interests between
the couple if it is "just and equitable" to do so. The court is required to
consider such factors as direct and indirect contributions, including those
contributions made in the capacity of homemaker, to the acquisition,
preservation, or improvement of the property.' 28 The court is also required
to consider, when relevant, the financial needs and obligations of the parties,
the responsibility for child care, or support of other people. 129 These rules
are echoed in the state statutes regulating the division of property in de facto
and domestic relationships.
These rules are in contrast to the New Zealand rules distinguishing
between separate property and relationship property, and requiring a
presumption of equal sharing of relationship property. Unlike the P(R)A,
the Australian statutes do not refer specifically to economic disparity.
However, under the Family Law Act 1975, the court can consider the future
needs of the applicant and adjust the order accordingly. In the past when
making orders altering property interests, the state courts have limited their
consideration to contributions. However, more recently, at least one state
court has held that the property division principles of the state statute were
similar to those of the Family Law Act in purpose and in operation, and
applied cases decided under that statute that considered the future needs of
the applicant.'
30
J. Opting Out of the P(R)A
Under the P(R)A, spouses or de facto partners can opt out of the
regime by contract.' 3 ' However, the court is authorized to set aside such an
agreement if "having regard to all the circumstances, it satisfied that giving
effect to the agreement would cause serious injustice.' 32  This "serious
injustice requirement" has replaced the presumably lesser MPA requirement
that it would be "unjust" to give effect to such an agreement. The court, in
128 Family Law Act, 1975, § 79(4) (Austl.).
129 Id. § 79(4)(e) (referring to section 75(2)).
130 Ferris v. Winslade (1998) 22 Fain. L.R. 725, 732 (Austl.).
131 Property (Relationships) Act, 1976, § 21. These rules are carried forward from the Matrimonial
Property Act 1976. See Matrimonial Property Act, 1976, No. 166, § 21.
13 Property (Relationships) Act, 1976, § 21J(1).
MARCH 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
deciding whether giving effect to the agreement would cause "serious
injustice," is required to consider the following factors identified in section
21J(4):
(a) The provisions of the agreement;
(b) The length of time since the agreement was made;
(c) Whether the agreement was unfair or unreasonable in the
light of all the circumstances at the time it was made;
(d) Whether the agreement has become unfair or unreasonable
in light of any changes in circumstances since it was made
(whether or not those changes were foreseen by the parties);
(e) The fact that the parties wished to achieve certainty as to the
status, ownership, and division of property by entering into
the agreement; and
(f) Any other matters the court considers relevant. 1
33
These factors are the same as those the court was required to consider
when deciding whether an agreement was void under the MPA, 34 with the
exception of the requirement in subsection (e), which is a new addition. In
the past there has been some concern that the courts have been too ready to
overturn agreements made in accordance with the MPA 1976.135
Presumably the changes introduced in section 21 of the P(R)A are intended
to address these concerns.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES
A. The Importance of Certainty in Determining the Existence of a De
Facto Relationship
The P(R)A may have far reaching implications for personal property
rights when relationships qualify as de facto relationships under the Act.
Accordingly, it is important that people know with certainty if, and when,
they are subject to the Act.
Historically, certainty in relation to the ownership of property has
been considered to be crucial. 36 Estates in land have long been explicitly
131 Matrimonial Property Act, § 21J(4).
:34 Id. § 21(10).
'35 See, e.g., Wood v. Wood [1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 234, 235; Lowry v. Lowry [1994] N.Z.F.L.R. 529.
136 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372 (1981) (certainty of title as controlling
remedy of specific performance); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 157 cmt. m (1936) (certainty as
controlling classification of remainder interest).
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defined and clearly identifiable. 137 The transfer of interests in real property
usually requires compliance with writing and registration requirements.
138
The MPA 1976 itself included a writing requirement: a marriage
conforming to the Marriage Act 1955.139 Conversely, rules regarding
adverse possession show the preference for a written conveyance of
property.
In contrast, no such certainty attends the rearrangement of property
under the P(R)A. People are not required to complete any formalities before
their relationship becomes a de facto relationship for the purposes of the Act.
Therefore, it will invariably be difficult for people to know with certainty
when and if their relationship qualifies as a de facto relationship for the
purposes of the P(R)A. Yet, at some point in time, with or without their
realizing it, a reordering of their property rights may occur.
B. Difficulties in Determining the Existence of a De Facto Relationship
The difficulty in identifying a de facto relationship surfaces in a
number of contexts outside of the P(R)A. The uncertainty of the meaning of
the term "de facto relationship" was acknowledged by the New Zealand
High Court in Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 140 a case involving a condition in
a will. The condition provided for certain payments to be made from the
deceased's estate to the widow. These payments were to be made "for so
long as she remains my widow and for so long as she shall not enter into a
de facto relationship (whether or not my said wife has entered into a de facto
relationship shall be at the sole and absolute discretion in decision of my
trustee . . . ).,,14 The court found that the condition was void on the basis
that the trustee would not necessarily be able to ascertain when the widow
had entered into a de facto relationship, and the widow, herself, would not
know with certainty when the trustee would consider that she, the widow,
had entered into a de facto relationship. These problems arose because of
the "difficulty in determining what are the characteristics of a de facto
marriage relationship as well as in determining when or at what stage that
relationship has been entered into."'4 2
'3' See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 4-22 (classification of estates); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry
E. Smith, Optional Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J.
1(2000).
1' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 125 (writing requirements for contracts for transfer of
interests in real property).
139 Marriage Act, 1955, No. 92, § 24 (marriage in prescribed form) (N.Z.).
"40 Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein [1986] 4 N.Z.F.L.R. 25.
' Id. at 26.
142 Id. at 30.
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C. Terms Such as "De Facto Relationship" Used in Other Legislation
Since Lichtenstein, the New Zealand courts have considered such
terms as "de facto relationship," "de facto spouse," 143 "relationship in the
nature of marriage,"' 144 and "living together as husband and wife, although
not legally married to each other, ' a on a number of occasions. 146 Most Of
these cases involved the distribution of state funding. The relevant
legislation provides for reduced payments to recipients that are married or in
marriage-like relationships.1
4 7
In Ruka v. Department of Social Welfare, the Court of Appeal
reversed a finding that a woman was living in "a relationship in the nature of
marriage" and fraudulently receiving a domestic purposes benefit under the
Social Security Act 1964. 148 The court considered it significant that there
was an absence of the mental and emotional commitment and the financial
interdependence necessary for a relationship to be "in the nature of
marriage" for the purposes of that Act.1 49  The judges stressed the
importance of considering the meaning of the phrase "a relationship in the
nature of marriage" in the context of the legislative history, policy, and
objectives or purposes of the Act. 150  As was noted in the decision of
Blanchard J and Richardson P, "other statutes use the same expression but
for different legislative purposes. What is or is not such a relationship may
be viewed differently for different purposes."' 5 1 In light of this approach, it
is important to consider the history, policy, and purposes of the P(R)A in
determining the existence of a de facto relationship.
' The term "de facto spouse" appears in section 102 of the Friendly Societies and Credit Unions
Act, 1982, No. 118, section 2 of the Coroners Act, 1988, No. 111, and section 2 of the Evidence
Amendment Act, 1994, No. 31.
14 This term appears in section 2 of the Status of Children Amendment Act, 1987, No. 132.
145 This term appears in section 7A of the Family Proceedings Act, 1980, No. 94. This section was
inserted by section 3 of the Family Proceedings Amendment Act, 1986, and applied from November 6,
1986.
146 See, e.g., Furmage v. Social Security Commission Decision No 284 [1977] 1 N.Z.A.R. 218. See
also Excell v. Department of Social Welfare [1991] N.Z.F.L.R. 241, Thompson v. Department of Social
Welfare [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 369; Ruka v. Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 N.Z.L.R. 154. For a
useful summary of early case law in this area, see W.R. ATKIN, LIVING TOGETHER WITHOUT MARRIAGE-
THE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 13-29 (1991).
117 Social Security Act, 1963, No. 136, § 63(b) & scheds.
148 Ruka v. Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 N.Z.L.R. 154.
"9 Id. at 162.
150 Id.
151 id.
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D. Difficulties in Determining When a De Facto Relationship Ends
Difficulty also arises in determining when a de facto relationship
ends. The P(R)A provides that a de facto relationship ends if the partners
cease to live together as a couple or if one of the partners dies.152 Again this
calls for an assessment of what constitutes "living together as a couple."
Ironically, even determining when a marriage ended for the purposes of the
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 has proven difficult. 153 The provisions in
the Family Proceedings Act allow for a separation agreement or order to be
used as evidence to determine when a marriage ended, providing one way to
avoid this problem. 154  No equivalent means of proof is available to
determine the end of a de facto relationship under the P(R)A.
The determination of the end of a de facto relationship was considered
by the Supreme Court of New South Wales under the De Facto
Relationships Act 1984, (the New South Wales equivalent of the P(R)A),' 55
in the unreported case of Theodossiou v. Cui.'56 The court held that "both
intention and behaviour will be necessary under the De Facto Relationships
Act to prevent secretive mental terminations being used as a fraudulent
device upon a naive partner."'157 This approach is consistent with Henry J's
statements in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Ruka v. Department of
Social Welfare, that a desire or intention to terminate a relationship, or an
absence of desire to continue the relationship, is not in itself sufficient to
bring about its termination, and is preparatory to, rather than indicative of,
termination. 5 8  Some "outward and objectively discernible manifestation"
that the relationship is over is required.' 59
E. Difficulties in Determining the Significance of a Sexual Relationship
The P(R)A, like the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (New South
Wales), states that no finding in relation to certain listed matters, or any
combination of them, is necessary to determine whether two people live
together as a couple. 60 The P(R)A directs the court to consider such matters
152 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001, § 2D(4).
3 See. e.g., Edwards v. Edwards [1979] 2 M.P.C. 51; Dorf v. Dorf [1982] 1 N.Z.F.L.R. 331.
154 Family Proceedings Act, 1980, No. 94, § 39(3) (N.Z.).
'5 De Facto Relationships Act, 1984 (Austl.).
116 Theodossiou v. Cui, 1997 NSW LEXIS 2259 (N.S.W. Dec. 3, 1997).
157 Theodossiou, 1997 NSW LEXIS, at *21.
158 Ruka v. Department of Social Welfare [1997] 1 N.Z.L.R. 154, 166.
159 Id.
'60 See De Facto Relationships Act, 1984, § 4(3) (Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act 1976, §
2D(3)(a).
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and attach such weight as may seem appropriate in the circumstances.'
61
However, the question remains as to whether any of the listed factors should
be more or less determinative. While "whether or not a sexual relationship
exists" is only one of the nine listed matters, it may be difficult for a Court
not to place particular significance on this aspect.
For example, this factor was dispositive in the New South Wales
Supreme Court's decision in Sim v. Powell.162 The court determined the
duration, nature, and extent of the relationship by reference to the existence
of a sexual relationship rather than a relationship "in the broader sense.
1 63
While undoubtedly many marriages are maintained despite the lack of a
sexual relationship, the reasoning in Sim v. Powell suggests that it may be
more difficult to convince a court that a de facto relationship (as compared
to a marriage) exists if the sexual relationship is "intermittent":
There are many very real distinctions between marriage and a
de facto relationship. For the present purposes, the most
significant is that people remain in the state of marriage despite
long absences. The essence of a de facto relationship is that the




In determining the scope of a de facto relationship, the court will have
to consider a wealth of personal information about the parties. There is a
danger that this will lead to the examination of the kind of intimate details
that used to be paraded before the court in the days of fault-based divorce.
In this exercise, the courts risk becoming bogged down by the discussion of
vindictive, irrelevant, or voyeuristic details. It is difficult for the judiciary to
stop counsel from straying in this direction, and sometimes, as is suggested
by the Australian experience, it is difficult for judges themselves not to
exacerbate the problem.' 
65
161 Property (Relationships) Act, § 2D(3)(a).
162 Sim v. Powell (1997) 22 Fam. L.R. 243 (Aust!.).
63 Id. at 245.
'64 Sim (1997) 22 Fam. L.R. at 245; Hibberson v. George (1989) 12 Fam. L.R. 725, 740 (Austl.). But
see Thompson v. Badger (1989) 13 Fam. L.R. 559 (Austl.).
165 For example, in one Australian case, it was arguably necessary for the judge to record in the
judgment that the couple had sex in one of the parties' cars, but probably unnecessary for the judge to
conclude that this showed "a lack of dignity." Davies v. Sparkes (1989) 13 Fam. L.R. 575, 578. Equally, it
was probably unnecessary for a judge to note in one case that the plaintiff was "an attractive woman." D v.
McA, 1986 NSW LEXIS 7001, at *1 (N.S.W. June 27, 1986). So too was it probably unnecessary
VOL. 1 1 No. 2
PROPERTY DIVISION IN NEWZEALAND
G. Difficulties in Determining the Significance of Financial
Interdependence
The court may also consider "financial interdependence" in its
determination of whether a de facto relationship exists. Bearing in mind the
Court of Appeal's approach in Ruka, in the context of social welfare
legislation, if the partners in a relationship are not financially
interdependent, it may be difficult for the court to conclude that the
relationship is a de facto one for the purposes of the P(R)A. This may be so
even though "the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and
any arrangements for financial support, between the parties"' 166 is only one of
the factors the Act specifies.
The P(R)A requirement that a couple divide their relationship
property equally at the end of the relationship is based on the assumption
that they were financially interdependent during marriage. Given that
"getting married" is a public declaration by two people that they have
undertaken certain obligations (including mutual support obligations) to one
another, it is defensible to assume that there is financial interdependence in
marriages, and to legislate for married people on this basis. This assumption
may not be equally defensible in relation to people in de facto relationships.
H. New Zealand Statistics
Statistics in New Zealand show that financial independence is
possible for more people in de facto relationships than in marriages. Many
people in de facto relationships are comparatively young and have
comparatively fewer children than their married counterparts. In the 1996
census, 62% of women and 73% of men, aged between twenty to twenty-
four years, in relationships, were in de facto relationships. In the 1996
census 49.0% of women in de facto relationships did not have children,
compared to 12.1% of married women. According to the 1996 census
87.3% of children in New Zealand had married parents. These figures
indicate that, in more de facto relationships than marriages, both parties were
(although amusing) for another judge to record that "(t)he evidence was that Australian men are not very
keen on flowers and it may be necessary for a flower seller, if her overall sales on a night are poor, to bring
down the price of a rose from $12 to $5 in order to sell it to an Australian. Chinese men are not keen on
flowers. Lebanese men find that flowers get in the way of their festivities and so are only interested in
arrangements like lets, which can be wom. Greek men, however, are particularly keen on flowers and will
give them to wives, girlfriends, singers, or even a wider group of ladies." Theodossiou v. Cui, 1997 NSW
LEXIS 2259, at *26 (N.S.W. Dec. 3, 1997).
166 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 2D(2)(d).
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likely to be working in paid employment thus having the potential to be
financially independent of each other.
Statistics from other countries also suggest that women in de facto
relationships are less likely to be financially dependent on their partners than
married women. Census data from the United States, for example, indicates
that both men and women in de facto relationships are more likely to be in
paid employment than their married counterparts. 167 De facto couples are
less likely than married couples to have children under eighteen living with
them. Women in de facto relationships are more likely than married
women to be older than their partners, have higher educational qualifications
than their partners, and earn more than their partners. 169 They are also less
likely to be in a traditional homemaking role. 
70
I. Difficulties in Attributing the Cause(s) of Economic Disparity
Under the P(R)A, a court may adjust the parties' shares in the
relationship property if the living standards of one spouse or de facto partner
are significantly higher because of the effects of the division of functions
within the marriage or de facto relationship. This rule presents some
difficulties. Identifying the extent to which any economic disparity at the
end of a relationship is a result of the effects of this as opposed to other
factors is difficult. Personal factors, such as individual talents, abilities,
motivation, and initiative may significantly affect what they are able to
achieve in the way of their living standards. The P(R)A is not intended to
compensate for personal inadequacies.
Systemic factors may also significantly affect people's living
standards. One such factor is the differential in average income between
men and women. Given that women's incomes in New Zealand are on
average 87.2% of men's incomes, 171 there will be economic disparity in
many cases where a heterosexual couple separates. However, the P(R)A is
not designed to correct for such systemic factors. The P(R)A's stated
principle that "men and women have equal status, and their equality should
167 Jason Fields & Lynne M. Casper, America's Families and Living Arrangements, in CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS 13 tbl.7 (U.S. Census Bureau ed., 2000).
'6' Id. at 13.
169 Id. at 14.
170 Id.
171 Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Income Survey June 2001, http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/
externml/pasfull/pasfull.nsf/7cf46ae26dcb6800cc256a62OOa2248/4c2567ef02476acc256ad8SO07839c3?
OpenDocument (June 2001).
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be maintained and enhanced"1 72 is a clear indication that the statute does not
countenance affirmative action.
J. Difficulties with Contracting out of the P(R)A
Prior to the enactment of the P(R)A, de facto couples in New Zealand
were free to contract with each other regarding their joint property interests.
These contracts were subject to the normal rules of contract law. However,
since August 1, 2001, contracts between de facto partners regarding property
matters are subject to the P(R)A. The court has authority under section 21J
to set aside an agreement if enforcing it would result in serious injustice.
173
The court is authorized to do this despite the fact that before signing a
section 21 agreement the parties are to have received independent legal
advice.' 74 Furthermore, section 26 empowers the Court to settle property for
the benefit of the children of the marriage or de facto relationship, regardless
of any agreement made under section 21.175 As a result of these provisions
in the P(R)A, people in de facto relationships have lost a significant amount
of their freedom to contract with respect to their property.
K Failure to Opt Out
The P(R)A applies retroactively to de facto relationships that were
commenced before the legislation was enacted. 176 The only way for people
in established de facto relationships to avoid the newly imposed property
division rules is to contract out of the Act.
The opt out nature of this regime is problematic. Some couples, for
whom it would be preferable to contract out, may not do so because of
ignorance of the need or desirability to do so. Others may be unrealistically
optimistic about the chances of the success of their relationship, or may be
uncomfortable about raising and addressing issues about property with their
partners. The opt out nature of the regime means that coverage by the
provisions of the Act is the default position for people in de facto
relationships who do not enter a section 21 agreement. Proponents of the
Act no doubt consider this to be the optimum way to ensure fair outcomes
172 Property (Relationships) Act, 1976, § IN(a).
173 Id. § 21J.
' Id. § 21F(3) ("Each party to the agreement must have independent legal advice before signing the
agreement.").
175 Id. § 26.
176 See id. § 2D.
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for all involved. Whether this is so depends on the appropriateness of the
regime for de facto couples.
L. Difficulties in Achieving Fairness Under the P(R)A
Those introducing the P(R)A 1976 to Parliament included de facto
couples under the regime on the basis that fairness required that people in de
facto relationships be subject to the same property division rules as their
married counterparts. Undoubtedly the identical rules will achieve the same
degree of fairness for de facto couples when their relationships are
effectively identical to marriages. However, the P(R)A is a blunt instrument
and it does not easily accommodate the individual circumstances of people
in de facto relationships who, unlike their married spouses, have chosen not
to be subject to the legal incidents of marriage. Once it is determined that
their relationship qualifies as a de facto relationship for the purposes of the
P(R)A, the particular circumstances of their relationship will not be
considered in the division of their relationship property, unless one of the
exceptions applies that allows for the departure from equal sharing. As
discussed earlier, courts are likely to find that the exceptions apply only in
very few cases. This imposition of the equal sharing presumption on de
facto couples is in stark contrast to the previous situation under constructive
trust jurisprudence, and to the situation in Australia where the "just and
equitable" requirement provides for the consideration of the particular
circumstances of the relationship as a matter of course.
M. Equality May Be Unfair if Financial Independence Maintained-An
Example
If a de facto relationship has been characterized by financial
independence, the equal sharing presumption may produce an unfair result.
For instance, consider the situation of two people who start living together
"as a couple" when they first leave university. They spend so much time
together that it makes sense to have just one apartment. At this stage they
have not given much thought to whether or not their relationship is long
term. Neither of them have any assets. It does not occur to them that they
will still be together six years later, or that by then their financial situations
will be quite different. They do not think to contract out of the P(R)A.
During their six-year relationship they both contribute equally to the rent for
their apartment and other living expenses. They both work full-time. One
partner, however, chooses to work extremely hard, is promoted a number of
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times, and, by the end of the relationship, is earning a large salary. This
partner saves diligently during the relationship and manages to accumulate a
sizeable share portfolio, an expensive car, and money in the bank. The other
partner prefers a more relaxed lifestyle with plenty of spare time to pursue
leisure activities. He is content to receive a minimal wage for a job that
requires a minimal amount of effort. At the end of the relationship, the
second partner has minimal savings. It is likely that at the end of the
relationship under the P(R)A their property would be divided equally.
The circumstances of this relationship are unlikely to be regarded as
extraordinary circumstances for the purposes of the section 13 exception to
equal sharing. If their relationship property is divided equally, the second
partner would receive property that was earned and saved by the first
partner, while the second partner pursued a leisurely lifestyle. In this
situation, equal sharing would not be a fair outcome. Although they
satisfied all the other factors for "living together as a couple" for the
purposes of the P(R)A, there was no element of financial interdependence
during the relationship.
The number of people in New Zealand in de facto relationships
characterized by financial independence is not known. If indeed most de
facto relationships are characterised by financial independence, the net result
of the 2001 reform will be unfairness.
V. CONCLUSION
New Zealand's relationship property regime, established by the recent
reforms, is unique because of the interplay between its scope provisions and
its property division rules. Accordingly, the New Zealand experience
provides the following useful insights for other jurisdictions considering
reform of their property division regimes for couples, particularly unmarried
couples. First, the inclusion of de facto couples under the same regime as
married couples, without any positive act by de facto couples to submit
themselves to the regime, places a great deal of importance on the need to
clearly identify if, and when, relationships will qualify as de facto
relationships. The automatic inclusion of de facto couples in the property
division regime is particularly significant because, once subject to the
regime, the presumption of equal division of relationship property applies in
all but extraordinary circumstances.
Second, there is a danger in implementing in one jurisdiction parts of
legislation from another, where other facets of the regime are significantly
different. The inclusion in the P(R)A of de facto couples under the same
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relationship property regime as married couples was clearly inspired by the
scope provisions of the New South Wales legislation of the same name
(Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW)). However, under this Australian
legislation the court is required to adjust the property allocation to achieve a
result that is "just and equitable." Under the P(R)A, in most cases the court
does not have the discretion to consider the individual circumstances of each
case and make adjustments to the property division to achieve a just and
equitable result. Thus a New Zealand court has little opportunity to remedy
any unfairness that may occur when equal sharing is not appropriate.
Finally, before enacting reforms with far-reaching implications for
personal property rights, rigorous research should be conducted to ensure the
appropriate regime is established. The New Zealand reforms were intended
to result in fairness in property division for de facto couples at the end of
their relationships. However, a lack of detailed knowledge of the
circumstances within which the majority of de facto relationships are
conducted raises questions as to whether fairness will result. In some cases,
particularly those involving financial interdependence between the parties,
the reforms may result in fairness. In other cases, particularly those
involving financial independence of the parties, this will not be so. Now,
only time will tell whether New Zealand's unique relationship property
regime will achieve its desired objectives.
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